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Les clauses de protection sont envisagées 
sous l’angle de la protection de l’acheteur et 
du vendeur. L’acheteur voit sa position sécu-
risée par l’usage des clauses d’assurance et 
des modalités de paiement et de non-concur-
rence. Le vendeur, lui, peut exiger la stipula-
tion de clauses de libération d’endossement, 
l’achat ou le rachat d’actions privilégiées 
émises, le remboursement d’avances à la 
compagnie, le gage d’actions jusqu’au paie-
ment de la dette d’achat des actions la vente 
à tempérament, la résolution et l’indemnité 
versable si des impôts supplémentaires 
étaient levés. En chaque situation il faut éva-
luer la pertinence des moyens disponibles. 
Par ailleurs, la clause d’achat par la com-
pagnie fait grand état des considérations fis-
cales afférentes. Des tableaux explicatifs et 
comparatifs agrémentent cette section qui 
pourrait sans quoi se révéler fort complexe. 
Au chapitre voué aux clauses pénales, les 
auteurs se montrent inventifs quant aux sor-
tes de pénalités possibles. Les dispositions 
du nouveau Code civil sur le caractère abusif 
potentiel de quelques clauses obligent à une 
plus grande prudence. Des conseils pratiques 
ponctuent leurs observations. 
Le chapitre 7 sur les clauses d’assurance 
est très intéressant. Il fait état des nouveaux 
produits d’assurance à la disposition des ac-
tionnaires et en relève les avantages et les in-
convénients. 
La seconde partie de l’ouvrage, beaucoup 
plus courte que la première, traite des clau-
ses de « société », de vote et d’administration. 
Cette partie ne comporte pas de nouveautés 
marquantes par rapport à l’ancienne édition, 
mais elle informe encore de façon appropriée 
sur des sujets peu touchés en droit corporatif 
tels que la convention de mise en commun 
(pooling agreemen)) et la convention de 
fiducie (voting trust). Selon les auteurs, cette 
dernière serait vraisemblablement une 
fiducie d’utilité privée aux termes du Code 
civil. Il sera intéressant de voir les tribunaux 
appliquer les règles de la fiducie d’utilité pri-
vée à ce contrat d’inspiration anglo-saxonne. 
Il existe maintenant sur le marché 
d’autres modèles de conventions d’actionnai-
res et des formules de renseignements de 
base nécessaires pour rédiger une telle con-
vention. Cependant, avec cette réédition, les 
frères Martel conservent Y autorité en la ma-
tière. Leur ouvrage est passionnant et très 
complet. 
Édith FORTIN, avocate 
Reinhardt Bérubé Fortin 
BJARNE MELKEVIK, Rawls ou Habermas : une 
question de philosophie du droit, coll. 
«Dikè», Sainte-Foy, PUL, 2002, 191 p.. 
ISBN 2-76377-837-2. 
In the fewer than 200 pages of his Rawls 
ou Haberma,, Bjarne Melkevik has given us 
some seven years of his reflections at confer-
ences on the philosophy of law. Without 
treatment of any third options to these two 
giants’ alternative groundings of law, all but 
one of the four chapters are comparative. 
Rawls is found wanting, despite having been 
Melkevik’s earlier mentor, while Habermas 
fits onto Melkevik’s legal philosophy today, 
as shown by references throughout to his 
own two recent books. 
Most of my queries will relate to his 
Rawls, while taking his voice as Habermas’. 
Melkevik’s five conference presentations re-
main relatively unrevised, and so they over-
lap, also upon the new chapter, preface and 
epilogue. But the recurring features help to 
identify what is of most importance to 
Melkevik. 
The themes of law and of democracy are 
central to the book, as they are to Habermas. 
Supporting these themes are notes regarding 
language, foundationalism and institutions. 
Giving them application, finally, is the world-
wide focus of law, to which Rawls turned his 
attention more recently than Habermas. 
These six themes can be summarized in six 
propositions : 
1) Law is the norms, rights and institutions 
chosen by subjects of law intersubject-
ively for themselves ; 
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2) Democracy is citizens’ autolegislation in 
the course of unbounded rational dis-
course ; 
3) The language turn in which speech 
performatively creates its own sense 
makes democracy ultimate ; 
4) Foundations of law, as of democracy or 
language, are available only by auto-
legislation ; 
5) Institutions of law are procedures or pro-
cesses for democratically autolegislating 
norms and rights ; 
6) Worldwide legality is legitimated also by 
democratic procedures. 
To each of these affirmations out of 
Habermas corresponds a proposition reject-
ing Rawls’ alternative : 
1) Law is not legitimated by hypothetical 
contracting of moral principles ; 
2) Democracy is not achieved by restricting 
access to information under veils of igno-
rance ; 
3) Language makes reliance on individual 
intuitions unfeasible ; 
4) Foundations for law, democracy and in-
stitutions cannot be provided by intu-
ition; 
5) Institutions of law are not democratic 
enough to rely upon for the legitimation 
of law ; 
6) Worldlaw’s legitimacy cannot be 
achieved by hierarchizing sovereignties in 
moral terms. 
I will consider each of these sets of propo-
sitions. 
Law. One of the welcome contributions 
Melkevik has made is to focus us so defini-
tively upon law in his study. Instead of the 
literature that is intent upon reducing law to 
some other category - to morals or to psy-
chology, to sociology or to metaphysics -
Melkevik presents his appreciation of 
Habermas as firmly jurisprudential. It is in 
the back and forth of politics that he insists 
on situating his subject. It is legality that must 
be legitimated, not some stand-in for it. 
For this Melkevik praises Habermas, but 
disclaims Rawls. While Habermas has fo-
cused on the properly juridical in his recent 
writing, Rawls is always hankering back to 
some system of morality. What does this 
mean ? While Rawls attends to legal institu-
tions, Habermas is attentive to legal subjects. 
Legal decisions are not primarily about the 
distribution of power, but about the ways of 
life for legal subjects. 
The advent of legality for Habermas is 
presented time and again as citizens’ 
autolegislation upon themselves of norms, 
rights and institutions which will affect their 
conduct. How will it affect them ? Is there 
some expectation from Habermas that citi-
zens are never under constraint, that the ra-
tionality in their uninhibited discourse will 
put all into agreement at the end ? And that, 
if it doesn’t, then they are not obliged le-
gally ? That would be a stipulative vision of 
law one which nobody experiences and so 
one defined into ideal existence for the sake 
of consistency with the democratic ethos. 
Another dimension of the same observa-
tion is that, in experience, law’s legitimacy is 
related far more to its efficiency than to its 
agreement. However much it is agreed to, a 
legal system which cannot manage to protect 
citizens from each other, and from other le-
gal entities, has no legitimacy. Its norms may 
meet all the criteria for democratic establish-
ment, but it bears no resemblance to anything 
we know of as law. Among the candidates for 
law some may purport to legitimacy by rea-
son of securing citizens’ safety ; and among 
these the more democratic the better. But 
however conversationally grounded may be 
the legal systems which cannot do that job 
they remain unlegitimated 
Is the problem here that Habermas is in-
tent upon legitimating laws, and not legal sys-
tems. That oversight was rectified half a cen-
tury ago by Hart, if not long before by 
Kelsen. One is left to wonder whether the 
analogous terms of “droit” and “Recht” are 
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not once again providing the slippage, to say 
about the autolegislation of “law” what could 
never be said of anything but “laws” and 
“rights” in English. Laws and rights are 
agreed upon ; but the law, legal systems, pro-
tect. 
Democracy. This is the heart of 
Melkevik’s and Habermas’ account of law. 
For only democracy can legitimate legality. 
So said Rousseau, and Kant on his heels. 
Melkevik points out several times that this is 
what does the work for them, and which pur-
ports to do it even for Rawls’ contract 
theory. Melkevik calls this “juristic moder-
nity”. While never explained in the book, as-
sume that the standard account that, as only 
the exercise of one’s own will suffices to im-
pose moral obligations on one’s own free-
dom so only the exercise of citizens’ wills 
suffices to impose legal obligations on their 
collective freedom. 
It is not the raw will of Rousseau nor the 
educated will of Kant that does the work for 
Habermas, but the will that is activated after 
its exposure to unlimited chat. Voluntarism 
in Melkevik and Habermas is presented as 
every citizen’s capacity to say “yes” or “no” 
to any proposal that is made in the proper 
circumstances of information and discussion. 
Far be it, that the citizen has chosen rightly, 
or even rationally in any other sense than 
having gone through the process of good con-
versation. The reason for faith in 
intersubjectivity is clear enough : not because 
citizens will come to find the right answer for 
there is none to be found ; not even that their 
agreement will make that outcome right for 
that is an illegitimate imposition of an inap-
propriate theory of knowledge ; but because 
that is all there is there is nothing more di-
rective to be hoped for argued towards This 
vacuum of veracitv does manage to ground 
the leeitimacv of aereement ; unfortunatelv 
it mav equallv well around a fascist imposi-
tion of solutions since the bells and whistles 
of good conversation have no more of 
grounding than does truth. 
It is in this context of democracy that 
Melkevik’s most devastating critiques of 
Rawls are made : that he is moralizing, that 
he is intuitionist, that as a result of these he is 
not even contractualist. One would have ex-
pected different, for Rawls’ contract also lo-
cates its sole legitimacy in consent, a volun-
tarist solution even when only rational 
consent manages to form the contract. 
Information vs. Ignoranc.. Rawls’ 
contractualism is denied because he conducts 
it behind a veil of ignorance which eliminates 
any meeting of minds from the very start. 
Only the fullest information grounds 
Habermas’ parameters for reliable dis-
course ; any restriction upon information is 
first a deficient rationality, and thereby sus-
pect when it is imposed unwillingly, and fi-
nally not too opaque a guise for manipulation 
by powerful interests. 
Everyone is familiar with Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance. That makes it hard to grasp why 
Habermas views it as a refusal of informa-
tion, rather than an incorrigible lack of infor-
mation. Granted that Rawls introduces the 
veil as a voluntary self-restraint from en-
trenching anyone’s private interests. But he 
moves on to show that we can’t do that any-
way. We cannot know whether today’s ad-
vantages will persist - Iris Murdock’s intelli-
gence became demented, Arthur Anderson’s 
stock became worthless ; and so when we 
contract for the long term we must plan lest 
our own worst-case scenario becomes also 
our disaster Our ignorance is real not 
feigned ; that is why we contract behind the 
veil It is neither blindfold nor burqua nor 
fashion accessorv thick or thin ; it is just 
blindness We have not refused any informa-
tion that we could have had 
Even were this not the case, self-control 
would have been the other name for the veil. 
And Habermas is the patron saint for such 
rationality in discourse. He would be no less 
likely than Rawls to disallow spousal testi-
mony against a mate, to exclude evidence of 
prior promiscuity against a rape complaint, to 
rule out information about damage insurance 
in determining liabilities upon a delict. 
Habermas too would rule out such informa-
tion not because it would be irrelevant to 
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results - its admissibility would have only 
too great a result ! - but because the informa-
tion is inconsistent with fairness. It is no dif-
ferent with the bias avoided and the fairness 
achieved by excluding unsharable singular 
benefits from the calculations of the contract 
of social justice. While for Rawls they are 
unfair, for Habermas they are irrational. 
What’s the complaint, then ? 
Moral vs. Lega.. Perhaps the complaint 
concerns another objection which Melkevik 
masterfully maintains throughout all of his 
chapters, that Rawls legitimates legality by 
means of “morals”. Contrary to this, 
Habermas legitimates legality only in purely 
legal terms, by democratic conversation, by 
procedurally rational discourse. 
There are many dimensions of this persis-
tent criticism. Rawls is sectarian, for foster-
ing Protestant morality ; Schmittian, for fos-
tering American-made morality ; totalitarian, 
for fostering Catholic naturalist morality ; 
anti-modern, for fostering any single moral-
ity at all, except for a conversational one. But 
how can one consider Rawls’ two principles 
of justice to be anything but purely secular ? 
That has been their most constant criticism 
from left and right : they are so secular, that 
they comprehend none of the concrete goods, 
religion included which give reality to the 
legal agent. 
Instead, Rawls’ two principles purport to 
be grounded in the peculiar rationality of that 
political agent, namely, seeking the way to his 
or her well-being. That rationality leads one 
not only to plan around her veil of ignorance, 
but also to order her equalities for maximum 
payoff. If she has all the socio-economic ad-
vantages of the second principle, but little 
first-principle equality to participate by civil 
liberties in their maintenance, then only will 
the veil of ignorance be rent ; for only then 
has she certainty about the future - she is 
then certain to lose her advantages. As well 
if one holds civil liberties of the first principle 
for any reason other than for benefiting citi-
zens who are less well off again their equal 
participation will also guarantee one’s loss of 
privilege Thus the two principles ; that’s the 
sum total of Rawls’ morality. It is based 
around rational agency, as much as 
Habermas’ ; and it places just as much of a 
premium upon participation. 
Constraint vs. Proteciion. A continuing 
complaint is that Rawls permits the legitimat-
ing discourse on legality to go on only within 
the confines of his two principles ; so the con-
versation is constrained, and to that extent 
not fully rational. That would be again a 
strange complaint to hear from Habermas, 
whose interminable defining of the param-
eters for rational participation boil down to 
just such constitutional protections. 
Habermas is no more willing to allow every 
privileged or bigoted assertion every hateful 
or destructive claim into the conversation 
that is Rawls. Nor is he any more inclined to 
have these considered and excluded one by 
one as they occur Habermas insists equally 
upon structuring the debate in advance so as 
to exclude them Rawls calls these constitu-
tional protections found in bills or charters 
of rights It would not lie in Habermas’ 
mouth to reject them as limiting participation 
in democratic debate nor for doing so perma-
nently and in advance 
Intent vs. Ethic. “Moral/morale” is 
equally ambiguous in Rawls’ English or 
Melkevik’s French, but that ambiguity is 
deepened by the ambiguity of conscience in 
French, meaning both psychological con-
sciousness and ethical conscience. Rawls 
does explicitly insist upon a moral (or up-
right) grounding for the legitimation of legal-
ity ; he does identify that with his two prin-
ciples of justice as fairness ; and he also does 
say this is moral (or intentional) because it is 
the structure of intersubjective moral agents. 
In its psychological sense “moral” refers to 
features of agency ; in its ethical sense 
“moral” refers to uprightness (Psychologi-
cal) moral agency is self-legislating ; what it 
legislates is the principles of justice ; these 
function as (upright) moral principles as well 
as legal principles This seems to sav that le-
gal norms are valid because thev rely on 
moral norms But the proper sense of the dic-
tion is that what is psychologically moral (or 
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intentional) grounds the principles of justice, 
and that the principles of justice govern what 
is acceptable legal conduct, what is ethically 
moral (or righteous) in the public domain of 
law. Rather than morals determining law, it 
is almost the other way around. 
Intuition vs. Intersubjectivity. Melkevik 
and Habermas still complain to Rawls about 
law being moral, because this psychological 
moralness of the agent has the same objec-
tion as does the ethically moral, namely it is 
subjective, rather than intersubjective. This is 
what the further puzzling complaint from 
Habermas’ camp means, that Rawls’ legiti-
mation is carried out by intuition. That this 
intuition is immediate, and has no steps mak-
ing up an argument, is not the main problem ; 
instead, the problem is that intuition has no 
steps that different people can take differ-
ently no argument on which they can dis-
agree. Given the anti-foundationalist assump-
tion that there is no meaning in the claim to 
know that something is true but only the 
commitment to truth-claims and evidence 
belaboured in Habermas’ volumes of the 70s 
then for intuition to govern is not only intol-
erable ; it is also totalitarian and anti-demo-
cratic Tt is not that Rawls’ principles are in-
tuitions but that there must be no intuitions 
of public rightness 
This is far more an issue for metaphysical 
resolution than Habermas’ spokesmen would 
allow, since that discipline is also disallowed. 
But, more concretely, does Rawls have to 
disagree ? That is, his principles of justice are 
not intuited, but are argued for ; they leave 
room for participation in a counterargument ; 
and generations of academics have made 
their careers in a Rawls-Industry by doing so. 
Rawls asserts them as true, that’s right, not 
because they are intuited, but because he 
found them to be adequately argued. He may 
be wrong ; but he’ d never say he could not be 
wrong. Why Habermas would still remain 
unsettled is because even an argued claim 
that a principle is true is intuitionistic since 
it remains a claim that is not reducible to 
agreement Rawls means his claim to be true 
even if there were no rawlsians even if ev-
eryone disagreed. That would mean it could 
be true even if only Rawls recognized the 
truth of his arguments, even if no else partici-
pated in formulating them, if no one was even 
aware of them. That is an intolerable affront 
to democracy for Habermas. The terrain 
must be ceded to democracy, not despite the 
loss of truth, but in order to accomplish its 
demise. 
Language. While anti-foundationalism is 
the topic straining at the gate, a brief discus-
sion sparked by Melkevik’s mentions of 
Habermas’ philosophy of language must pre-
cede it. It is “the language turn” that under-
pins communicational theory and in turn the 
democratic legitimation of law. While no 
definition is given for the language turn, a 
variety of propositions combine to deliver its 
sense. A language is a set of opportunities 
which both make possible and predetermine 
what can be said. Speech is the activation of 
those possibilities which also “transgresses” 
upon them to expand the possibilities. 
Speech does this because it is performative 
since it accomplishes what it says Perlo-
cutional modes of speech are not only one 
among several ; thev transgress upon illocu-
tions and locutions since speeches bring 
about the meanings to which they may ap-
pear simply to refer 
A curious phenomenon infects this pre-
sentation of the linguistic turn that Habermas 
and Melkevik would approve. What is curi-
ous is that a stress upon language, structural-
ist or Wittgensteinian, rules out private lan-
guage, and without that the subject “drops 
below the horizon”. This non-subjectivity is 
an important part of Melkevik’s and 
Habermas’ critique, and their demand for 
democracy. Transgression by speech upon 
language leads one to expect that some sub-
ject must be reintroduced with all of its self-
determination freed from the social 
constructivism of structural theorists. But 
that is not the case ; in various modes of lin-
guistic turn theories of performative speech 
continue to deny the subject its self-determi-
nation and the possibilities for its self-
achieved truth intuition or moralitv The 
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only subject actualised is the secondary, so-
cially constructed one ; and the only self-de-
termination is the autolegislation of its com-
munal standards, the democratic legitimation 
of legality. This is a very mixed conclusion ; 
one ought to drop either the premise of a lan-
guage turn, or the conclusion of democracy, 
for the inference between them fails. 
Foundations of Law. Allergy to founding 
law can stem from speech-act theory, and 
leads on to Habermas’ democratic theory, 
that is, autolegislation of their own norms, 
rights and institutions by participants in ra-
tional discourse. Before turning to 
Habermas’ and Rawls’ respective apprecia-
tion of institutions, domestic and worldwide, 
this moment allows attention to the only ver-
sion of anti-foundationalism Rawls shares 
namely the technique of reflective equilib-
rium which Melkevik does not treat because 
Habermas does not. 
Rawls’ reflective equilibrium is a con-
stant correction of presuppositions by evi-
dence, and of evidence by presuppositions. 
Evidences are observed facts, including so-
cial preferences ; presuppositions are estab-
lished beliefs, including social preferences. 
The reason for invoking these self-correc-
tions is that issues of public policy and mo-
rality are matters of “essential contestab-
ility”. Rawls’ technique of contrasting ideas 
to ideals, concepts to conceptions, takes root 
in this issue. 
Reflective equilibrium, along with the fal-
sification theory fashionable at the time, 
looked to no identifiable source of truth. But, 
neither does it in principle deny that. Rawls 
steers well clear of metaphysics, clear enough 
even not to deny it or to make it superfluous, 
long before his late-life disclaimer that his 
theories answer a “political, not metaphysi-
cal” question. 
Utility vs. Publicity. The remaining facet 
of Melkevik’s treatment of Rawls’ intuition-
ism comes into play in his critique of Rawls’ 
rule-utilitarianism. It is opposed once again 
to Habermas’ democracy, although now the 
critique seems to belong more to Melkevik 
than to Habermas. Rule-utilitarianism de-
fines benefits, and in turn the rationality of 
pursuing those benefits, in the manner of ra-
tional choice theory. Benefits are those 
which the agent can enjoy by himself, can 
extend to others only by losing his own full 
share, and so effectively cannot share with 
others ; they are zero-sum benefits. That defi-
nition of benefits fails a priori as a legitima-
tion for legal theory because it does not per-
mit of any common benefit such as law is, 
and a fortiori any common (read : demo-
cratic) way of determining its achievement 
and distribution. 
Rawls certainly requires that, in under-
taking the hypothetical contract, each one 
bargains for what is to his own advantage 
rather than only for others’ advantage. But 
this does not at all mean that commonly 
shared or public benefits are not to one’s own 
advantage, and that one cannot bargain for 
them. All that is excluded are those benefits 
which others must enjoy alone, to the exclu-
sion of the bargainer. Even here, those oth-
ers do not include the bargainer’s intimate 
associates, or friends ; for them, one is per-
mitted to bargain even though their enjoy-
ment of the benefits excludes one’s own 
since their exclusive enjoyment by a valued 
possessor is one of the benefits which make 
up one’s own enjoyment There is no limit in 
principle upon this extension : beyond 
friends to neighbours ; beyond them to fel-
low citizens 
Another of Melkevik’s criticisms of 
Rawls’ rule-utilitarianism is that punishment 
of the innocent is excluded as a practice be-
cause it is socially pointless and without ben-
efit. It is excluded as an action because it is 
not in accord with the prevailing practice, 
that of punishing only the guilty. Melkevik’s 
criticism of this rationale melds with his pre-
sentation of Habermas’ critique of institu-
tions, since in the case of the particular ac-
cused it is left up to a judge’s moral 
conscience whether to engage in the public 
practice of not punishing the innocent or to 
engage instead in his private practice of fol-
lowing his private conscience (or : not follow-
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ing it) and punishing this innocent person. It 
is hard to see how this critique holds, as long 
as the practice of the judge doing his duty 
holds. 
The more general issue in this regard, 
however, relates to the notion of practices, 
those rule-governed activities with which 
rule-utilitarianism is concerned. Melkevik 
terms practices as habitudes. Practices deter-
mine what actions are right and wrong ; this 
displaces the determination on such matters, 
democratically, as the occasion arises. In ap-
preciating this criticism, however, it must be 
remembered that such habitudes are not hab-
its. They do not embrace all exceptions and 
cover all new cases in advance. In law they 
are not even constructed only out of rules 
but also from principles ; a “principle-utili-
tarianism” is conceivable and in law it is the 
only plausible candidate for a practice As a 
result practices whether exclusive or open 
are not immune to evaluation amendment or 
rejection ; doing so is yet another practice 
That practice may be aristocratic but it can 
equallv take the form of democratic reconsid-
eration meeting anything Habermas might 
have demanded of the practice Nothing 
about a practice inherently resists democ-
„ „ „ . racy. 
Institutions of Law. Melkevik is one of 
few jurisprudents versed in institutionalism, 
so his remarks on Habermas’ and Rawls’ 
treatment of legal institutions is significant. 
Habermas looks to full participation in demo-
cratic process as the way that citizens legiti-
mate legal institutions ; they autolegislate 
their norms, rights and institutions. Without 
that process, legal institutions lack legiti-
macy. There is no treatment of whether that 
is in whole or in part, whether there are de-
grees of legitimacy, and whether they yield 
degrees of obligation. 
Rawls locates institutions’ legitimacy in 
the post-contractual process by which they 
are authorized. Institutions achieved in that 
way act as limitations upon an unconstrained 
process of rational conversation, and so foil 
democracy, and thereby institute their own 
legitimation crisis. 
Enough has been said to address the 
rights and the norms, the first by a process of 
constitutional entrenchment and the latter by 
a principled consequentialism, with whose 
stability and permanence Habermas should 
have no complaint. Surely he cannot envis-
age a legal society in which the subjects of 
rights have no freedom to engage in lifeplans 
because they can have no reliance upon what 
will later be the entitlements and obligations 
which environ their choices now. As Fuller 
pointed out, as Aquinas a bit earlier, this way 
of failing to promulgate is one of the surest 
“ways to fail to make law”. 
Regarding legislatures and courts, 
Habermas suggests that their unresponsive-
ness to democracy may be remedied by “new 
social movements”, NGOs at home and UN 
agencies at large. The openness by each of 
these to unconstrained discourse is not ap-
parent ; their freedom from ideology and 
their insulation from partisan force remains 
to be shown. Of course it is not their own 
internal democracy that Habermas intends, 
but the democracy of the whole that will is-
sue from their participation in the legal af-
fray along with authoritative public institu-
tions. But again their unwillingness to abide 
contradiction and their tendency to suppress 
others in order to reach their own objectives 
gives little confidence that a democratic rem-
edy lies in them Only in their mediated and 
proportionate context for the presentation of 
their aims does their democratic contribution 
get a footina This has lona been called a rep-
resentative majoritarian leaislature 
Perhaps it is their distance from the sub-
jects of rights, the citizens, that render legis-
latures undemocratic, since again their de-
mocracy has to consist in us authors of rights 
autolegislating our norms, rights and institu-
tions. Perhaps the alternative to this medi-
ated or representative democracy is the real 
democracy of direct self-governance. Does 
Habermas conceive that such hateful refer-
enda as “Do you want your government to 
negotiate property rights with aboriginals, or 
to impose them ?” (BC) such manipulative 
questions as “Do you want your provincial 
government to initiate negotiations toward a 
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revision of constitutional arrangements with 
your federal government ?” (PQ), and such 
divisive questions as “Do you wish abortion 
to be recriminalised ?” (CA), improve the 
achievement of democracy ? Their remedy 
lies in their control by proportionate and par-
tisan legislatures, and by constitutional pro-
tections, as experience suggests, and as 
Rawls designs. 
The role of judicial institutions, further, is 
best seen in Habermas’ critique of Rawls’ 
postulation of the role of a supreme court in 
the realm of worldwide law. 
Worldwide Legality. Melkevik’s most 
current chapter is devoted to the issue of 
worldwide law, call it “international” in 
Rawls’ recent law of peoples, or “cosmopoli-
tan” in Habermas’ less recent harking back 
to “perpetual peace”. Rawls’ moralism reap-
pears in his hierarchizing the peoples of the 
world according to how closely they observe 
his two principles of justice ; his anti-demo-
cratic institutionalism appears by his taking 
those peoples and their institutions are as the 
actors in the world forum. Habermas natu-
rally is democratic by taking as worldwide 
subjects of right only natural persons singu-
lar individuals not peoples ; and this leaves 
him nothing to hierarchize since all natural 
persons are equally subjects of the rights they 
autolegislate for themselves 
Melkevik and Habermas may have failed 
to note why Rawls needs his hierarchy of 
peoples. Rawls’ theory does not require en-
mity among nations, unlike Schmitt’s ; 
Rawls’ outlawing of nations which resist his 
principles of justice does not make enemies 
out of them, but only refrains from privileg-
ing them, as an instrument of state policy, 
and not as international law. They become 
enemies only when they take this restraint as 
a hostile act, and respond hostilely. It is prob-
ably the case that proselytising their way of 
life by nations which follow Rawls’ two prin-
ciples would be an act of enmity in 
Habermas’ eyes since political missionary 
activity is an attempt to reduce one type of 
multiplicity rather than to revel in it Exclud-
ing missionary activity from the range of 
democratic discourse, however, would be 
problematic for a principle of open democ-
racy. 
Rawls’ jolting way of posing this conclu-
sion about legal institutions both domestic 
and worldwide is to make a national supreme 
court the prominent governing body. 
Melkevik and perhaps Habermas find this 
outrageous ; it strips the court of reliability as 
an even-handed arbiter of democratic dis-
agreement, and makes it into a branch of gov-
ernment that is ideologically precommitted, 
and so unresponsive to rational discourse. 
What is its precommitment, however ? To 
constitutional protections. The court is com-
mitted to preserving legislation which re-
spects the two principles of political justice. 
As witnessed above Habermas takes that to 
be moralizing undemocratic foundational 
and hostile Melkevik has posted his agree-
ment convincingly I’ve posted my disagree-
ment Rawls’ principles are the product of 
democratic process They may also be wrong 
That epistemic status gives them the democ-
racy of respecting subjects of right ; for these 
authors are left with the capacity to argue 
that these are the right principles for public 
moralitv to commit themselves to those and 
to enconrage others to receive their benefits 
Or to argue and vote against them. 
Bjarne Melkevik’s new book is a compe-
tent and valuable advance of an all-important 
discussion in the philosophy of law. 
Melkevik moves past two of the greatest fig-
ures of last century, to stake out his own 
ground, while making its innovations reso-
nate with the insights of Scandinavian legal 
realism, particularly of Ross : that facts and 
not theories are what the philosophy of law 
should attend to ; and that recourse to meta-
physics in the philosophy of law involves 
hiding from the changing facts by weaklings 
whose character is not strong enough to en-
dure constant change. I happen not to agree. 
But that does not stand in the way of taking 
much profit from Melkevik’s competent 
study 
Christopher B. GRAY 
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